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This paper is concerned with the representation of preferences which do not
satisfytheordinaryaxiomsforstate-independentutilities. Aftersuggestingreasons
for not being satisﬁed with representations using state-dependent utilities, an alter-
native representation shall be proposed involving state-independent utilities and a
reliability factor on acts. The latter represents the degree to which purported acts
can actually succeed in yielding promised consequences given particular states.
This factor captures the interdependencies between states and consequences. Two
sets of axioms are proposed, each permitting the derivation of subjective proba-
bilities, state-independent utilities, and a reliability factor, and each operating in a
different framework. The ﬁrst framework involves the concept of a decision situa-
tion – consisting of a set of states, a set of consequences and a preference relation
on acts; the probability, utility and reliability functions are elicited by referring
to other, appropriate decision situations. The second framework, which is techni-
cally related, operates in a ﬁxed decision situation; particular “subsituations” are
employed in the derivation of the representation.
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1 Introduction
It has been known for many years that the axioms implying the state-independence of
utilities which appear in many classical theories of decision, such as those of Savage
(1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963), do not hold in many important situations,
such as cases of life insurance (Arrow, 1974). The conclusion normally drawn is that
a representation involving state-dependent utilities is required; thus the work on this
subject (for example Karni et al. (1983); Karni and Mongin (2000); Karni and Schmei-
dler (1993); Schervish et al. (1990); Drèze (1987); Drèze and Rustichini (2004)). This
is however not the only option; in this article, an alternative representation shall be
proposed, and a representation theorem for it proved.
A major motivation for state-dependent utility theorems can be illustrated on an
examplecloselyrelatedtothatproposedbyAumanninhiscorrespondencewithSavage
(reproduced in Drèze (1987, pp76-81); this version is taken from Karni (1996)). A
woman is to undergo a potentially fatal operation, with 50-50 chances of survival. Her
husband, who knows the odds, is offered two bets: one pays $100 if the operation is
successful and nothing if not; the other pays $100 if the operation is not successful
and nothing if it is. Although the chances of winning the money are equal in either
case, the husband would apparently choose the former bet, because the $100 would be
much more precious to him if his wife were with him to enjoy it. If one considers the
consequences (elements to which the husband allocates utility values) to be winning
$100 and winning $0 and the states to be success and failure of the operation, it seems
that the utility of the consequences depends on the states: $100 is more “desirable” if
the wife survives than if she does not. Thus the need for state-dependent utilities.
This is not however the only way of analysing the situation. In his reply, Savage
suggests representing the decision by the same set of states, but using as consequences
the following four elements: $100 with survival, $100 with death, $0 with survival, $0
with death. In the “make-believe” situation where the husband considers that any act
(function from states to consequences) taking values in this set of consequences as an
available option – and in particular, the act which, in thecase where the operations fails,
would yield $100 and the wife returned to him in good health – the axioms of state-
independent utility apply and the classical representation theorems can be employed.
Eachofthesewaysofanalysingtheexamplehasitsprice. Underthestate-dependent
analysis, the agent’s utilities for the consequences depend on the states involved: it thus
becomes impossible to use these utilities in decision situations where the same set of
consequences are on offer, but the states of the world are different. Consider the case
where the agent is offered a bet on a horse race, with the consequences being appropri-
ate combinations of $100 and $0 with his wife’s health or death: wouldn’t one expect
him to have the same utilities in this situation as in the one described in the story above?
Under the state-dependent analysis, this cannot be the case, since the states on which
the utilities are to be dependent (success and failure of the operation) are not involved.
On the other hand, Savage’s approach relies on an imaginary situation without mak-
ing it clear what relationship there is with the situation in which the agent actually
ﬁnds himself. Intuitively, it seems that several “make-believe” acts, such as the one
mentioned above, are not on offer in the actual situation. However, merely noting this
is not sufﬁcient. First of all, the restriction to acts “on offer” is posed exogenously to
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the decision theory used (in this case, Savage’s). Furthermore, it is known that results
such as Savage’s cannot incorporate such restrictions, since they depend on the avail-
ability of a full set of acts (that is, all functions from states to consequences); indeed,
such restrictions generally lead to representations in terms of state-dependent utilities
(Hammond (1998, §6) considers the case, pertinent for this example, where the conse-
quences attainable from different states are distinct).
Examples such as the one proposed by Aumann clearly involve some form of con-
nection between the states and the consequences. However, the considerations re-
garding the state-dependent representation seem to suggest that such interdependencies
should not necessarily be built into the utilities, because it would become impossible
to understand the relationship with the utilities of the agent with respect to the same
consequences but in a decision situation involving different states. If there is interde-
pendence of states and consequences in the agent’s decision, then it must be speciﬁc to
situations where these states and consequences are involved. A natural suggestion is to
represent the interdependence by a situation-dependent factor expressing the relation-
ship between states and consequences. The representation would then be as follows.
For S the set of states involved in the situation, C the set of consequences and  a
preference relation on acts (functions from S to C) there is a probability function p on
S, a (state-independent) utility function u on C and a function 
 : S  C ! ( 1;1],
such that, for any acts f;g,









In fact, the consideration of Savage’s approach to the example yields a natural
interpretation for the factor 
. The state where the operation fails and the consequence
where he wins $100 and his wife is healthy are inconsistent: any act purporting to take
the former to the latter is thus not possible (in the decision situation the husband is
actually in). If offered such an act (or such a bet), the agent would not trust the bookey.
The act is unreliable (or, more precisely, the part of the act purporting to send this state
to this consequence in unreliable). The factor 
 can represent this by taking a very low
value on this pair; indeed, the fact that it is so low would also explain why the agent
does not choose this unrealistic act. Conversely, 
 would take the maximum value 1
on pairs which are totally compatible. The act purporting to take the state where the
operation succeeds to the consequence where the husband has $100 and a healthy wife
is entirely reliable: accordingly 
 takes the value 1 on this pair. In other words, the
factor 
 represents the reliability of the acts, or more precisely of the parts of the acts
purporting to take a particular state to a particular consequence. This is a pleasing
interpretation of the factor: notably, the reliability is something which depends on the
state and the consequence, and is generally particular to the decision situation. The
factor 
 shall henceforth be called a reliability factor.
In the example, the factor takes two extreme values depending on the consistency
or not of the state with the consequence. However, by allowing the range of 
 to vary
between  1 and 1, it can represent more subtle interdependencies between states and
consequences. Suppose that, instead of being potentially fatal, the operation is minor,
with the same chances, and the husband is being offered the same bets. In such a
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case, the interdependence between the states and consequences comes in the form of a
preference of having the $100 when the wife is happy, so that he can enjoy it with her.
However, because her condition is only minor, it may well turn out that he gets to enjoy
the $100 with a happy wife, whatever the outcome of the operation, and similarly, that
the wife will be unhappy after the operation, even if it is a success. The difference is
that if the operation succeeds the wife has a more chance of being happy than if it does
not. In other words, an act purporting to take a successful operation to $100 with a
happy wife is more reliable than the (not totally unreliable) act purporting to take an
unsuccessful operation to $100 with a happy wife. A reliability factor taking a higher
value on the former pair than on the latter can represent this.
The basic idea behind the representation theorem which states conditions for the
elicitation of p, u and 
 representing the preferences according to (1) is already present
in Savage’s reply to Aumann. He brought into play another decision situation, where
the axioms of his representation theorem hold, and thus where a (unique) standard,
state-independent representation thus exists. The representation theorem proposed be-
low will operate, for the preference relation in a given situation, by looking ﬁrst in
other situations where conditions for state-independent utilities hold, taking the prob-
abilities and utilities from these other situations in the representation of the preference
relation in the situation of interest, and using these to calculate the reliability factor.
To ﬁnd such “independent” situations, fantasy on the scale of Savage is not required:
all that is needed to elicit the utility is a situation with the same set of consequences,
but possibly different states, where the conditions for state-independence apply (simi-
larly for probabilities). For example, the decision situation described above where the
agent is offered bets on a horse race, with consequences involving combinations of a
healthy / deceased wife and $100 / $0, could be used to elicit utilities. In Section 2
a formal notion of situation shall be deﬁned, postulates and axioms shall be proposed
and a representation theorem shall be proved.
The natural interpretation of the other situations involved in the result is hypothet-
ical. The agent is in one situation (the situation of interest) at the current moment,
and has to make a choice between the acts available in that situation. The preference
relations in the other situations represent the preferences he would have (and decisions
he would make), had an alternate set of acts been available – had the situation been
different. This is not the ﬁrst result to rely on hypothetical preferences: for example,
hypothetical preferences are central to the state-dependent utility representation theo-
rem presented in Karni et al. (1983); Karni (1985), and defended in Karni and Mongin
(2000). Note however that whereas in that framework it was hypothetical beliefs about
a ﬁxed set of states that was employed, here it is hypothetical sets of states or of con-
sequences – and thus hypothetical options – that are used. Many of the arguments
presented in Karni and Mongin (2000) in favour of the use of hypothetical data in elic-
itation carry over to the current result. Furthermore, there are independent reasons that
motivate representation theorems which take into account different decision situations
and the relations between them: see Hill (2007c) and Hill (2007a) for such arguments.
These will relieve many of philosophical or methodological qualms with the use of hy-
pothetical data. However, those who remain unconvinced will be happy to know that
the result does not depend on the use of hypothetical situations. Indeed, an essentially
identical theorem can be formulated and proved, using a similar method, in the context
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of a single decision situation; that is, without resorting to the notion of hypothetical
situations. This theorem shall be given in Section 3.
2 Situational version
2.1 Preliminaries
A decision situation is characterised by a sets of states and a set of consequences, with
a preference on the acts.
Deﬁnition 1 (Situation). A decision situation  consists of a set S (of states in the
situation), a set C (of consequences in the situation) and a binary relation  on the
functions in CS
 (acts in the situation).1
AsetofsituationsS isassumedtobegiven. Thissetsatisﬁesaminimalconsistency
constraint: the agent can only have one order of preference on any set of (hypothetical)
acts which can be envisaged.
Postulate 1. If, for 1;2 2 S, S1 = S2 and C1 = C2, then 1=2.
This constraint allows the situations to be thought of extensionally; that is, any two
distinct situations differ either in their sets of states or in their sets of consequences (or
both).
Remark 1. There is another consistency condition which may be imposed, and which
relates to the possibility of “identifying” acts between situations. An act is a function
from states to consequences: there is thus no way of saying that two acts are the same if
they belong to situations with different sets of states (they have different domains). By
contrast, it does seem that one could identify acts which belong to situations with the
same set of states and which give the same consequences (they have the same domain
and the same image), although the sets of consequences available in the situations to
which they belong differ (they have different ranges).2 This sort of identiﬁcation is
expressed by the following axiom.
Axiom A1. For any pair of situations 1 = (S1;C1;1) and 2 = (S2;C2;2)
with S1 = S2 = S and C1 \ C2 6= ;, 1 j(C1\C2)S =2 j(C1\C2)S.3
This axiom shall not be necessary for most of the results in the paper, and shall not
be supposed to hold unless explicitly stated.
The decision-theoretic framework used here is that proposed in Anscombe and Au-
mann (1963), which shall now be brieﬂy resumed.
For a given situation , S is assumed to be ﬁnite, and C is assumed to be the set
of lotteries over a ﬁnite set X. Acts – functions from states to lotteries – are thought
1Standard mathematical notation whereby, for two sets A;B, BA is the set of functions from A to B,
shall be employed.
2Consider for example  = (S;C;) and 0 = (S0;C0;0), where S = S0 and C 
C0: it seems intuitive to identify an act in  with the act in 1 in that gives the same consequences for each
state.
3For an order 6 on a set Y and Y 0  Y , 6 jY 0 is the restriction of 6 to Y 0.
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of as functions from S  X ! <; that is, the set of acts is CS
 = ff : S  X !
<j
P
x2X f(s;x) = 1g.4 Under these assumptions, CS
 is a mixture set with the
mixture relation deﬁned pointwise: for f, h in CS
 and a 2 <, 0 < a < 1, the mixture
af +(1 a)h, deﬁned by (af +(1 a)h)(s;x) = af(s;x)+(1 a)h(s;x) (Fishburn,
1970, Ch 13). So the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms can be stated for the orders
on acts, .
Axiom A2 (Weak order). (a) For all f, g in CS
 , f  g or g  f. (b) For all f, g
and h in CS
 , if f  g and g  h, then f  h.
Axiom A3 (Independence). For all f, g and h in CS
 , and for all a 2 <, 0 < a < 1,
if f  g then af + (1   a)h  ag + (1   a)h.
Axiom A4 (Continuity). For all f, g and h in CS
 , if f  g and g  h, then there
exist a;b in (0;1) such that af + (1   a)h  g and g  bf + (1   b)h.
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) add the following axiom:5
Axiom A5 (Monotonicity). For any elements c1 and c2 of C, any f in S  C and
any s in S, if c1  c2 then fc1
s  fc2
s .
where c is the constant act taking value c (for all s 2 S, f(s;x) = c(x)) and fc
s is
identical to f, except on s, where it takes value c (that is, for fc
s(s;x) = c(x) and, for
s0 6= s, fc
s(s0;x) = f(s0;x)).
Fishburn (1970, p146) has shown that axioms A2-A4 imply that there is a repre-
sentation of  by a real-valued function on S  X which is unique up to simple
positive afﬁne transformation. Anscombe and Aumann (1963) show furthermore that
adding axiom A5 yields a decomposition of this function into a unique probability
function over the set of states and a state-independent utility function over the set of
outcomes, which is unique up to positive afﬁne transformation. Indeed, the Monotonic-
ity axiom is so closely connected to state independence that it is often simply called
the axiom of state independence (in Hammond (1998), for example).
The current work will use these results. Therefore, in the remainder of the discus-
sion, the following postulate and deﬁnition shall be made:
Postulate 2. For any situation ,  satisﬁes A2-A4.
Deﬁnition 2.  is called a simple situation if and only if  also satisﬁes A5.
The simple situations are those which permit the application of the Anscombe and
Aumann representation theorem. Let us state this explicitly.
Theorem 1 (Anscombe and Aumann (1963)). For a simple situation , there is a
unique probability distribution p on S and a utility function u on X which is
unique up to positive afﬁne transformation, such that, for f;g 2 CS








4In thinking of acts in this way, Anscombe and Aumann’s “Reversal of Order” axiom is assumed to hold
(Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). As is standard in much work with this framework, this axiom shall be
assumed to hold in all situations, throughout this paper. The consequences of rejecting it are explored by
Drèze (1987), for example.
5See note 4 regarding their other axiom.
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The basic idea is to use this sort of elicitation in simple situations to give a rep-
resentation of the preferences in non-simple situations. Some preliminary deﬁnitions
may ease the discussion.
Deﬁnition 3. For a set of consequences C, let C = f 2 Sj C = C; simpleg.
This is the set of simple situations with C as set of consequences.
Deﬁne kCk = fuj 9 2 C;p on S;p;u represent g, the set of utilities
involved in the representation of the preferences (according to (2)) in the simple sit-
uations. Such utilities exist by Theorem 1 and Deﬁnition 2. The elements of this set
will be considered only up to positive afﬁne transformation, to avoid unnecessary rep-
etitions.
Similarly, for a set of states S, deﬁne S = fj S = S; simpleg, and kSk =
fpj 9 2 S;u on C;p;u represent g.
The idea is to use the simple situations, C, and in particular the representations of
the preferences in these simple situations, kCk, to ascertain the utility in non-simple
situations which have C as the set of consequences; similarly for probabilities. For this
several consistency constraints need to be placed on C and S. Such constraints will




Axiom A6. For all C, C is non-empty.
A6 is a richness assumption: there are enough situations that, for each set of conse-
quences, an “independent” set of states can be found: independent in the sense that the
state-independent expected utility result of Anscombe and Aumann applies. In other
words, this axiom guarantees that kCk has at least one element.
The next supposition is the following.
Axiom A7. For all C, kCk has at most one element (up to positive afﬁne transforma-
tion).
A7 is a consistency assumption: that the utilities over consequences is the same in
all situations with independent states.
This axiom may seem excessive, especially in view of that fact that Theorem 1
does not guarantee that the states and consequences are independent, since the expected
utility formula may be re-written, with state-dependent utilities for example, and the
axioms still satisﬁed (Karni, 1996; Karni and Mongin, 2000). In this paper, it is the
possibility of representing interdependencies between states and consequences accord-
ing to (1) which is at issue, so that the appropriate question is the following: could
there not be two simple situations (S1;C;1) and (S2;C;2) having representations
p1;u1 and p2;u2 respectively (according to (2)), with u1 6= u2, but such that (say) 2
admits a representation of the form (1) involving the utility u1? In such a case, the two
situations would have “fundamentally” the same utility, although the utilities ﬁguring
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in their state-independent representations (2) would differ: the axiom A7, in ruling out
such situations, might thus seem unjustiﬁed.
However, there are reasons for being suspicious of such pairs of situations. In par-
ticular, note that consequences are in one-to-one correspondence with constant acts, so
that  engenders a binary relation on consequences; because of A2–A4, this relation
satisﬁes the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms and so can be represented by a utility
function. Furthermore, by the uniqueness properties of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern
and Anscombe and Aumann representations, and the fact that the engendered relation
agrees with the full preference relation on constant acts, it follows that this utility func-
tion is a positive afﬁne transformation of the utility obtained from Theorem 1. So,
if simple situations differ on the utilities involved in the representation (2), then they
must disagree on the preferences among constant acts. This seems unreasonable: it
does not seem that one should have a different order on acts taking all states to the
same consequence, just because of a change in the set of states involved. Accordingly,
it becomes difﬁcult to think of the agent having “fundamentally” the same utilities in
such situations. Such mild inconsistency on the part of the agent is prohibited by A7.
ThisreasoningyieldsanotherversionofA7, whichmaybemoreattractive, notonly
from the point of view of intuition, but also because it is more in line with standard
decision theory, where the functions obtained in the representation theorem do not
appear in the axioms:
Axiom A8. For all C, for any 1;2 2 C, const
1 =const
2 , where const is the
restriction of  to the constant acts.
A7 and A8 are equivalent.
Proof. If A7 holds, there all simple situations accord the same utilities to consequences
(up to positive afﬁne transformation), and thus to constant acts, so A8 holds.
On the other hand, if A8 holds, then using the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem
on the preferences on constant acts, one obtains a utility function on constant acts –
and thus consequences, which applies in all situations. However, in each situation, the
utility provided by Theorem 1 must also represent the preference over constant acts,
by (2); by the uniqueness properties, such utilities must agree up to positive afﬁne
transformation. So A7 holds.
Remark 2. This version of the axiom might seem so pleasing that one is be tempted
to extend it to all situations, rather than only simple ones. After all, as concerns acts
which yield a particular consequence whatever the states of the worlds are, the states
of the world in play should (do?) make no difference on one’s preferences over these
acts. One thus obtains the following, strictly stronger axiom.
Axiom A9. For all C, for any (not necessarily simple) 1;2, C = C1 = C2,
const
1 =const
2 , where const is the restriction of  to the constant acts.
This axiom simpliﬁes the technique used to obtain the representation, to the extent
that it implies that, to elicit the utilities, it is not necessary to look at other situations:
it is sufﬁcient to use the constant acts. Thus, in the presence of this axiom, A6 is thus
strictly speaking not required. Furthermore, as shall be seen in Theorem 2, this axiom
simpliﬁes the representation, in so far as it results in stronger uniqueness properties.
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2.3 States
One proceeds in a similar way for states; once again, the strategy relies on two suppo-
sitions:
Axiom A10. For all S, S is non-empty.
This is the state equivalent of A6: a richness assumption assuring that kSk has at
least one element.
Axiom A11. For all S, kSk has at most one element.
A11 is the state equivalent of A7: a consistency assumption guaranteeing that the
probabilities over states is the same in all situations with the same set of states.
As in the case of consequences, one may object to the latter axiom that Theorem
1 only guarantees that there exists a unique state-independent representation of prefer-
ence, but does not guarantee that there is no, potentially more “accurate”, representa-
tion of the form (1). Could one not have a pair of simple situations, (S;C1;1) and
(S;C2;2), with representations p1;u1 and p2;u2 (according to (2)), where p1 6= p2,
but such there is a representation of (say) 2, of the form (1), involving p1? At least in
the presence of A8, the answer is no. First of all, if this were the case, then one would
have the following equation
(3) p1(s):u0(x):
(s;x) = p2(s):u2(x)
However, given A8, the utility in the representation (1) of the preference relation
in the simple situation (S;C2;2) must be the utility representing the constant acts in




p1(s).6 However, this solution is unacceptable: it is absurd that 
 – the factor
which is supposed the represent the interdependencies between the consequences and
the states in this situation – is independent of the consequences. Indeed, given such a
consequence-independent 
, the only possibility open seems to be to absorb it into the
probability, thuscollapsingbackintothestate-independentrepresentationwhichwasto
be avoided. There is thus no representation of the required sort with p1 as probability.
If kSk has more than one element, it is because the agent assigns “fundamentally
different” probabilities to the states S in different situations. Such mild inconsistency
on the part of the agent is prohibited by A11.
As for the case of consequences, one might, to avoid using the representation ex-
plicitly in the axioms, formulate A11 in terms of orders, as follows:
Axiom A12. For all S, for any 1;2 2 S, for any a;b 2 X1 and c;d 2 X2 with
a const
1 b and c const
2 d, let  : L(fa;bg)S ! L(fc;dg)S be the bijection between
the set of acts in 1 with values in the set of lotteries on fa;bg and the set of acts in
2 taking values in the set of lotteries on fc;dg,7 deﬁned by (f)(s;c) = f(s;a) and
6Assuming that p2(A) = 0 whenever p1(A) = 0 and setting 
 = 1 at such points; without this
assumption, there is no solution.
7L(X) is the set of lotteries on the set X.
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(f)(s;d) = f(s;b) for all s 2 S.8 Then, for all f;g 2 L(fa;bg)S, f 1 g iff
(f) 2 (g).
A11 and A12 are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose A11 holds, that is, that all simple situations accord the same probabili-
ties, p, to the states of S. Consider situations 1, 2 and elements a;b 2 X1 and c;d 2
X2 satisfying the conditions of A12. The utilities u1 and u2 representing the orders
in these situations can be scaled so that u1(a) = u2(c) and u1(b) = u2(d). But then,





so the preference orders behave as in A12.
Suppose now that A12 holds. For any two simple situations 1 and 2 with set
of states S, and any pairs a;b 2 X1 and c;d 2 X2 satisfying the conditions of
A12, take the representations p1, u1 and p2, u2 with u1(a) = 0;u1(b) = 1 and
u2(a) = 0;u2(b) = 1. Consider the following acts in 1: for each A  S fA,
with fA(s;b) = 1 for s 2 A, fA(s;a) = 1 for s = 2 A (and f(s;x) = 0 else-
where); for each element y of L(fa;bg), the constant act gy taking the value y. Note
thatp1(A) =
P
S;X1 p1(s)u1(x)fA(s;x) = infy2L(fa;bg);fA1gy
P
X1 y(x)u1(x).
However, the image of each of these acts under  is of the same type (respectively,
f0
A;g0
y0), and u2 takes the same value as u1 on the images of the elements involved, so,
for all A  S, p1(A) = p2(A). This establishes A11.
Remark 3. Another perspective on A12 may yield a more intuitive formulation. It is
like Savage’s P4 in so far as it states that, to compare probabilities of events (sets of
states) using acts which differ in their consequences depending on whether the event
holds, it does not matter if one uses consequences in C1 or C2: the answer will be the
same. But P4 holds within simple situations (to the extent that this sort of independence
holds in the Aumann-Anscombe framework9). So if A12 holds between C1 and C2,
one might expect P4 to hold on the union of them. This is essentially what is expressed
by the following axiom.
Axiom A13. For any S, if 1;2 2 S, then there is a situation 12 2 S with
C12 = C1 t C2, where C1 t C2 is the set of lotteries on X1 [ X2.
In the presence of A1, A13 implies A11 (and thus A12).
Proof. Suppose A11 does not hold for some S. Then there are simple situations
1;2 2 S, with representations involving p1 and p2, where p1 6= p2. By A13,
the situation 12 with set of states S and set of consequences C1 tC2 is simple, and
so has representation with probability p12. By A1, 1 coincides with 12 on the acts
common to both situations; so by the uniqueness properties of Theorem 1, they must
be represented using the same probability on S. The same goes for 2: so p1 = p2,
contradicting the supposition.
8As per usual in the literature, the acts are considered as functions from pairs of outcomes and states to
real numbers, summing appropriately; see Section 2.1.
9It holds to this extent: the restriction of the preference order to acts taking values in lotteries over a
subset of outcomes gives the same probability in the application of Theorem 1 as the full preference order.
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Null events One ﬁnal remark is required regarding the possibility of null events. In
the state-independent representation, null events are generally those which are allo-
cated probability 0: it follows that the order is indifferent between any pair of acts
which differ only on such events. For the probabilities elicited in simple situations to
be valid in non simple situations, the preference order in these non simple situations
must show the same sort of indifference. Thus the following axiom is posed as a con-
sistency constraint. Recall the classic deﬁnition of a null event (Savage, 1954; Karni
et al., 1983): an event A in a situation  is null iff, for any pair of acts f;g 2 CS
 such
that f(s) = g(s) for s = 2 A, f ' g. (Null states are those whose singletons are null
events.) The axiom is as follows.
Axiom A14. For any situation  and any event A  S, if A is null in every 0 2 S,
then A is null in .
2.4 Theorem
The representation theorem involving situations is the following.
Theorem 2. Assume Postulates 1 and 2. Moreover, let A6, A8, A10, A12, A14 hold.
Then, for any situation  2 S, there exists a probability distribution p and a positive
utility function u on S and X respectively, and a function 
 : S  X ! ( 1;1]
such that,
 for all f;g 2 CS

(4)









 for each 1 2 C, there exists a probability p1 such that, for all f1;g1 2 C
S1
1


















Furthermore, if p0, u0, 
0 is another representation satisfying equations (4-6), then
there exist real numbers b and d, and positive real numbers a and c, such that p0(s) =
p(s), u0(x) = a:u(x) + b and 




s 2 S;x 2 X, where d = 0 if the situations in S have null events.
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Proof. Existence. If  is simple, the existence of the representation (4), with 
(s;x) =
1 for all s;c, is given immediately by Theorem 1. By A8 and A12 (and the application
of Theorem 1 in other simple states), this representation satisﬁes the other two clauses.
Suppose  is not simple. By A6, A8, A10, A12, there is a unique probability
function p and a positive utility function u, unique up to positive afﬁne transformation,
satisfying (5) and (6).10
By A2-A4 (Postulate 2), a version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem ap-
plies in  (Fishburn, 1970, p176), giving the representation by a function U : S 
X ! <, unique up to simple positive afﬁne transformation; that is, for all f;g 2 CS
 ,







Pick U such that, for each (s;x) 2 S  X, U(s;x) 6 p(s):u(x) and such that
U(s;x) = 0 on the null states (if  has any).
Deﬁne 





p(s):u(x) if p(s) 6= 0
1 if p(s) = 0
By the choice of U and u, 
 takes values in ( 1;1]. Moreover, by construction
and by A14, (4), (5) and (6) hold.
Uniqueness. The uniqueness properties of p and u follow from the application of The-
orem 1 to the situations in S and C. Moreover, as noted above, U is given up to
simple positive afﬁne transformation. So, for another representation p0, u0, 
0, there
are a, b, c and d, with a and c positive, such that, for all s 2 S;x 2 X, p0(s) = p(s),
u0(x) = a:u(x) + b and p(s):
0(s;x):u0(x) = a0:p(s):
(s;x):u(x) + b0. Substituting
for u and solving for 
0, one obtains the required result, with c = a
0
a and d = b0. If the
situations in S have null events, then p(s) = 0 for some s 2 S, so d must be zero.
That 
 loses this degree of freedom in the case of null events in natural: since U must
be chosen to vanish on events which are null in situations in S, the only admissible
transformations of U are multiplicative (they have b0 = d = 0).
Remark 4. The theorem does not assume A1, and so allows differences between the
preferences on acts taking the same set of states to the same consequences, but which
are elements of different situations. In such cases, the representations of the preference
orders in the different situations will differ in 
 (the p and u are ﬁxed by construction).
On the other hand, if A1 holds, the preference orders agree between situations
(on common acts), so the representation yielded by the von Neumann-Morgenstern
theorem will be the same (up to positive afﬁne transformation) and 
 will take the
same values (up to the transformation given in Theorem 2) in all situations which share
the same set of states and which have at least two outcomes in common.11
10Recall that the set X of outcomes is ﬁnite.
11If two situations with the same states have a single outcome in common, they only have one act in
common (the constant act on the common outcome); A1 is empty in this case, so no conclusion can be
drawn regarding the values of 
 on the common state-outcome pairs.
12c 
Brian Hill Living without state-independence of utilities
3 Non-situational version
3.1 Preliminaries
As noted above, the use of other situations may be shunned. However, they are not
strictly necessary: instead of thinking of different situations, one could consider the
sets of states, consequences and acts of each situation to be an appropriate subset of
elements (events, consequences, acts) of some large, ﬁxed situation. Situations are
considered to be like the “microcosms” of (Savage, 1954, §5.5); so the relation of their
(small world) states and consequences to any ﬁxed (grand world) states and conse-
quences can be understood. Hence, it shall be possible to formulate an equivalent to
Theorem 2 in terms of one “grand world” situation. This the Theorem 3 stated and
proved in the current section.
S shall designate a set of states of this grand world situation, X the set of outcomes,
C the set of lotteries on X, and  the preference order on the set of acts CS. B is the
(atomic) Boolean algebra of events (sets of states) in this situation. Finally, in this
section, only the case where S and X are ﬁnite shall be treated (hence, as shall become
clearer below, the number of small world situations will be ﬁnite).
Contrary to Savage, the grand world situation is being approached from the point
of view of the set of small world situations. Therefore, for the technique used above
to work, it shall have to be assumed that the grand world situation is exactly what is
obtained by “putting together” all the small world situations, and nothing more. For
example, the outcomes in the grand world situation would be the union of the sets
of outcomes for all the situations i: X =
S
Xi. The sets of consequences Ci
for individual situations thus end up being (mixture) subsets of the grand world set
of consequences C; any grand world consequence can be obtained as the appropriate
mixtures of small world consequences (this results from the deﬁnition of the set of
grand world outcomes as the union of the small world ones).12 It shall turn out that, for
the case of consequences, this relationship between the grand world and small world
situations is not too important; by contrast, what happens with states is more crucial.
In the case of states, a small world state will correspond to a grand world event;
that is, a set of grand world states. However, to ensure that the grand worlds states
are exactly the possibilities arising from the states in all the small world situations, the
following condition is required: each grand world state is entirely characterised by the
set of small world events of which it is a member (ie. events corresponding to states of
the small world situations).
Technically speaking, the situation is rather delicate. The set of states Si of dif-
ferent situations  are the set of atoms of a Boolean algebra Bi. To ensure that the
grand world situation is exactly that which subsumes the small world situations and no
more, the algebra of events B should be the “product” of the Boolean algebras, Bi,
and the states should be the atoms of this algebra. The free product of the Boolean
algebras13 yields the Boolean algebra whose set of atoms (states) is the Cartesian prod-
uct of the sets of atoms (states) of the original Boolean algebras. If this product is used
12The relationship between grand world consequences and small world consequences is different to that
used by Savage: see below.
13See Koppelberg (1989).
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for small world situations with sets of states fSigi2I, the set of states of the grand
world situation would be iSi. However, in general, the appropriate product is not
the free product, because there may be dependencies between states in different (small
world) situations which are not accounted for by the free product. For example, if two
different situations 1 and 2 involve the fact of it raining or not, each i will con-
tain an event Ai – it is raining.14 Then the free product will contain states where A1
and not A2 – it is raining in the sense of situation 1, but not in the sense of situation
2. Unless one accepts that two situations can never involve the same fact about the
world (two situations can never contain the fact that it is raining, in the same sense), the
free product will not be appropriate in general. There does exist a more complicated
product, involving quotienting of the algebras after taking the product, which works
in general (see Hill (2007d,b)). However, to simplify the result and its formulation, it
shall be assumed here that there are no such dependencies between states of different
situations, so that the free product can be used.15 From the point of view of the small
world situations, this means that the algebra of events of the grand world situation is
the free product of the algebra of events of the small world situations. Equivalently, the
set of states of the grand world situation is the Cartesian product of the sets of states
of the small world situations. From the point of view of a grand world situation con-
sidered as given, this means that there are sets of sets of events (morally: each set of
events is the set of states of some small world situation) such that each state in S is the
unique element in the intersection of a selection of events, one from each set, and this
selection of events is maximal (no subset would sufﬁce). Thus the following axiom.
Axiom A15. There exist a set of sets of elements of B, fSigi2I, such that, for each
element s 2 S, there is a set fss
ig, with one element ss
i from each Si, such that T
i2I ss




s02A s0 = fsg.
Remark 5. Reneging on the freeness of the product (independence of the sets of small
world states Si), one sacriﬁces the maximality clause of the axiom.
In this axiom, the elements ss
i are alternatively thought of as states of the small
world situations and as events of the grand world situation. Indeed, throughout this
section, small world states shall be treated as grand world events without change of
notation.
The small world situations are thus those situations (Si;C0;0) where C0 is the set
of lotteries on X0 for some X0  X and 0 is the restriction of  to acts which are
constant on the elements of Si and which take values in C0.
Note that 0 is deﬁned in such a way that an act f in the (small world) situation
(Si;C0;0) is considered as a (grand world) act ^ f, where, for each s 2 S, ^ f(s;x) =
f(si;x), for si the element of Si such that s 2 si. This interpretation, which differs
from Savage’s interpretation of microcosms (Savage, 1954, §5.5),16 is at least partially
justiﬁed by the use of independent sets of states: if the states are independent, there is
14It is assumed that neither of these events contains the whole set of states (of their respective situations).
15Without this assumption, a version of the theorem appears to hold, though it is more complicated.
16Thus the difference in the interpretation of small consequences, which are not grand world acts, as in
Savage.
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less chance that states which are not in play in some small situation might effect the
grand world interpretation of the small world act.
3.2 Axioms
The von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms A2-A4 shall be assumed to hold in the grand
world situation. This assumption is logically stronger than the equivalent assumption
in the situational setup (Postulate 2): the former implies the latter, because it implies
that the axioms hold in individual situations; but the former is not implied by the latter
because it involves inter-situational comparisons.
Indeed, since the orders in the small world situations are restrictions of a single or-
der, they agree on the acts they have in common: A1 holds automatically. Furthermore,
constant acts are acts which take the > of the algebra B to particular consequences.
However the > is the same whether considered as an element of the grand world al-
gebra (all the states in S) or of any of the small world algebras (all the states in that
situation). Hence constant acts – considered as constants acts in different situations –
coincide. Therefore, Axiom A8 is automatically implied in the grand world algebra
framework; in fact, the stronger axiom A9 holds. For this reason, the existence axiom
A6 is not required (see Remark 2).
For states, things are more complicated: the equivalents of the existence and con-
sistency axioms are not automatically satisﬁed. The equivalent of the existence axiom
A10 is as follows:
Axiom A16. For each Si, there exists X0  X such that (Si;C0;0) is simple (where,
as above, C0 is the set of lotteries on X0).
As for the uniqueness part, an appropriate axiom is the following.
Axiom A17. For each Si, there is a maximal X0  X,17 such that (Si;C0;0) is sim-
ple (with C0 and 0 as above). Call this set Xi, the corresponding set of consequences
Ci, and the order on the preference order i.
In this framework (notably, where A1 holds and where the simple situations under
consideration all have sets of states Si for some i), A17 is equivalent to A13.
Proof. Suppose A13 but not A17. Then, there is a S0 and X1 and X2 such that
(S0;C1;1) and (S0;C2;2) are simple, and X1 and X2 are maximal. But, by A13,
X12 = X1 [ X2 also yields a simple situation (S0;C1;2;1;2), contradicting the max-
imality of X1 and X2.
Suppose A17, and consider any pair of simple situations (Si;C0;0) and
(Si;C00;00), for sets of outcomes X0 and X00. Since X0;X00  Xi (by A17),
X000 = X0 [ X00  Xi, and since 000 coincides with i on common acts (by A1),
(Si;C000;000) is simple; so A13 holds.
Finally, the equivalent of A14 is as follows.
17That is: maximal under inclusion.
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Axiom A18. If A  Si is a null event in (Si;Ci;i), then
S
A si is a null event in
(S;C;). (In other words, if A as an event in (Si;Ci;i) is null, then it is null as an
event in (S;C;)).
3.3 Theorem
The following theorem states that, for a given set of states, consequences and a pref-
erence relation on acts (ie. a grand world situation), which admits appropriate small
world situations in the way described above, there is an (essentially) unique represen-
tation of the preference relation in terms of a probability distribution, a utility function
and a reliability factor.
Theorem 3. Let S be a set of states, X a set of outcomes, C the set of lotteries over X
and  an order on CS. Let A2-A4 hold on . Furthermore let A15 - A18 hold, calling
the relevant set fSigi2I. Then, there exists a probability distribution p and a positive
utility function u on S and X respectively, and a function 
 : S  X ! ( 1;1] such
that,
 for all f;g 2 CS
(8)














(s;x):u(x) = u(x) + 
 For each i 2 I, there exists positive i and real i such that, for each si 2 Si,





(s;x):u(x) = ip(si):u(x) + i
Furthermore, if p0, u0, 
0 is another representation satisfying equations (4-6), then
there exist real numbers b and d, and positive real numbers a and c, such that p0(s) =
p(s), u0(x) = a:u(x) + b and 




s 2 S;x 2 X, where d = 0 if there exists a situation (Si;Ci;i) with null events.
Remark 6. (9) corresponds to (5) of Theorem 2 in so far as it expresses the unique
representation of the order on constant acts by u.
(10) corresponds to (6) of Theorem 2 in so far as it reﬂects the fact that the induced
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Proof. The proof proceeds in much the same way as that of Theorem 2.
Existence. By A2-A4, a version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem can be
applied (Fishburn, 1970, p176), yielding a non-negative von-Neumann Morgenstern
utility function U (unique up to similar positive afﬁne transformation) on S  X. If 
has null states, then pick U such that U(s;x) = 0 on the null states. Let Uconst be the
restriction of U to constant acts. That is, Uconst(x) =
P
S U(s;x).
By A16-A17 and Theorem 1, for each Si, there is a unique (Si;Xi;i) with Xi
maximal, and a unique pi and ui, unique up to positive afﬁne transformation, repre-











Since both ui and Uconst represent the constant acts taking values in Ci, they are
positive afﬁne transformations of each other. The orders i are thus represented (in the
sense of equation (11)) by pi and Uconst.
By A15, for each s 2 S, there exists a unique set fss
igi2I, si 2 Si, with s = T
i2I ss






Finally, pick u a positive function, obtained by positive afﬁne transformation of
Uconst, such that for each s 2 S x 2 X, p(s):u(x) > U(s;x), and deﬁne 
 to be the





p(s):u(x) if p(s) 6= 0
1 if p(s) = 0
By the choice of U and u, 
 takes values in ( 1;1]. By construction and by A18,
p, u and 
 satisfy (8). Therefore
P
S p(s):
(s;x):u(x) represents the restriction of 





au(x) + b for all x 2 X. Thus (9) is satisﬁed.
In a similar way, for each i 2 I, both p, 
 and u, and pi and u represent i:
the ﬁrst via (8), the second with (11) and the fact that u is a positive afﬁne transfor-
mation of Uconst. But, by construction of p, pi(si) =
P
s2si p(s) = p(si). Thus,
by the uniqueness of the representation of i up to positive afﬁne transformation,
there exist a positive real i and a real i such that, for each si 2 Si;x 2 X: P
s2si p(s):
(s;x):u(x) = i:pi(si):u(x) + i = i:p(si):u(x) + i. So (10) is
satisﬁed.
Uniqueness. The uniqueness properties of p follow from Theorem 1, A15 and A17, and
the uniqueness properties of u from the application of the von Neumann-Morgestern
theorem. This theorem also implies that U is unique up to simple positive afﬁne trans-
formation. So, for another representation p0, u0, 
0, there are a, b, a0 and b0, with a and
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a0 positive, such that, for all s 2 S;x 2 X, p0(s) = p(s), u0(x) = a:u(x) + b and
p(s):
0(s;x):u0(x) = a0:p(s):












p(s):u0(x), and thus the required result,
with c = a
0
a and d = b0. If there is a situation (Si;Ci;i) with null events, then the
probability p(s) vanishes for some s, so d = 0. As in Theorem 1, this restriction in the
degree of freedom of 
 is natural and for the same reasons.
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